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INTERSECTIONALITY AND THE
CONSTITUTION OF FAMILY STATUS
Serena Mayeri*
Marital supremacy—the legal privileging of marriage—is,
and always has been, deeply intertwined with inequalities of race,
class, gender, and region. Many if not most of the plaintiffs who
challenged legal discrimination based on family status in the 1960s
and 1970s were impoverished women, men, and children of color
who made constitutional equality claims. Yet the constitutional
law of the family is largely silent about the status-based impact of
laws that prefer marriage and disadvantage nonmarital families.
While some lower courts engaged with race-, sex-, and wealthbased discrimination arguments in family status cases, the
Supreme Court largely avoided recognizing, much less crediting,
their constitutional significance. Moreover, constitutional family
status jurisprudence mostly overlooked claims to sexual
autonomy, sex equality, and racial and economic justice arising
from plaintiffs’ lived experience of intersecting status-based
harms. The result is a constitutional family law canon that often
obscures the social reality of legal regimes that elevate marriage
at the expense of equality.
At particular historical moments, advocates have seized
upon social movement victories and associated developments in
constitutional doctrine—a brief openness to race-based disparate
impact and economic justice claims, the emergence of sexual
privacy and sex equality principles—to expose and exploit the
intersections between race, class, gender, and family status-based
inequality. Plaintiffs and their lawyers made race- and poverty* Professor of Law and History, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am
grateful to Tonya Brito, Clare Huntington, Robin Lenhardt, Melissa Murray, and Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, as well as participants in the Constitution and the Family panel at the
2017 AALS Annual Meeting and the Moore Kinship Symposium at Fordham Law School
for illuminating comments and conversations. Special thanks to Jill Hasday for her
thoughtful reading of an earlier draft of this Article, and for including me in this
symposium.
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based discrimination arguments against laws and policies that
distinguished between individuals and families based upon
marital status. For instance, when advocates challenged
“illegitimacy” penalties such as the denial of wrongful death and
workers’ compensation, inheritance rights, and government
benefits to nonmarital children and their parents, they often
argued that such policies had a disparate impact on families of
color. Indeed, all of the early illegitimacy cases were brought by
African American women and their children, but no Supreme
Court opinion so much as mentions race.
Intersectional harms often underpinned legal assaults on
family status inequalities. Challenges to welfare policies that
capped AFDC benefit amounts, as well as lawsuits against
“suitable home” and “substitute father” policies included race
(and sometimes “family status”) discrimination claims. Women of
color and concerns about racially disparate impact played a
prominent if often unspoken role in litigation challenging
mandatory paternity disclosure for unmarried women poor
enough to be eligible for public assistance. Constitutional and
statutory challenges to policies excluding “unwed mothers” from
employment frequently combined race and sex discrimination
claims, contending that such restrictions disproportionately
burdened women of color and frequently betrayed invidious
racial motivation.
Courts often decided these cases without engaging the race
discrimination claims, and the racial context frequently receded
from judicial consciousness as cases moved up through appellate
courts. That is not to say that the racial subtext had no impact on
legal decisionmakers, however: there is evidence that it did,
sometimes to plaintiffs’ advantage. As the 1970s wore on, though,
plaintiffs more frequently framed their claims as sex
discrimination: they emphasized the severe disparate impact on
women of laws penalizing nonmarital parenthood, given women’s
disproportionate responsibility for the care and support of
children generally and nonmarital children in particular.
Nonmarital fathers’ claims, too, usually sounded in terms of sex
discrimination (or due process, in the case of parental rights)
rather than racial discrimination. Even so, women and men of
color remained at the forefront of challenges to laws that
discriminated based on marital status and sex.
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Race and sex discrimination arguments were not inherently
more progressive than other framings of plaintiffs’ constitutional
claims, of course. Many of the race- and poverty-based
discrimination arguments promoted by opponents of illegitimacy
classifications in the late 1960s, for instance, were perfectly
compatible with the prevailing judicial trope of innocent (poor,
black) children suffering unjustly for their parents’ “sins.” And
applying formal sex equality principles to nonmarital fatherhood
risked obscuring the disproportionate burden mothers tended to
bear for the care and support of nonmarital children, as well as
economic, social, and physical power differentials between men
and women. The political valence of equality arguments
depended on their substantive content. To the extent that
constitutional claims derived from the lived experiences of
individuals and families shaped by racial, gender, sexual and
economic subordination, they could expand the meaning of
principles such as equality, liberty, autonomy, and due process.
When plaintiffs invoked the Constitution to vindicate a right to
engage in nonmarital sex without reprisal from the government or
a private employer; to call upon the state for benefits regardless
of marital or birth status; or to exercise parental rights over
nonmarital children, they laid claim to the universal significance
of their particular experience.
The courts’ failure to recognize claims based on these
intersectional experiences had wide-ranging and lasting
consequences for equality law. Those consequences are visible in
the Court’s approach to illegitimacy classifications, which sees
their primary harm as punishing “innocent children” for parental
“transgressions,” leaving untouched the legitimacy of privileging
marriage in public and private law. They are visible in the federal
constitutional jurisprudence of nonmarital fatherhood, which
reflects the values of the divorced fathers’ rights movement and
of traditional adoption advocacy more than feminists’ concerns
about women’s subordination, or poverty lawyers’ desire to
protect poor families from state intrusion. They are visible in state
welfare policies that find no constitutional harm in requiring
mothers to cooperate with authorities in identifying and seeking
child support from impoverished fathers. We can also see these
consequences in the Supreme Court’s same-sex marriage
jurisprudence, which characterizes unmarried individuals and
nonmarital families as legally, socially, and economically inferior.
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Marital supremacy is alive and well, even in an age of marriage
equality.
In previous work, I have provided detailed historical
accounts of constitutional litigation campaigns against
illegitimacy penalties that targeted nonmarital children and their
parents, and of debates over the constitutionality of restrictions
on nonmarital fathers’ parental rights.1 This Article builds on
those accounts in an effort to think systematically about why the
Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence of the family has so
little to say about the status-based inequalities that prompted
plaintiffs to bring their claims and shaped advocates’ strategy.
Part I describes how race- and poverty-based discrimination
arguments figured prominently in early constitutional litigation
challenging “illegitimacy”-based classifications and asserting
welfare rights, but receded from view by the early 1970s.
Notwithstanding the Court’s silence on the relationship between
race, poverty, sex equality, and family status, African American
women attempted to redefine women’s sexual and economic
citizenship in the 1970s based on the intersectional experience of
unmarried mothers of color, as Part II chronicles. Profound
disagreements persisted, however, among advocates and
policymakers who contested the relationship between poverty
and family structure, and the role of the state in affecting both.
Cases concerning the constitutional rights of unmarried fathers
became a battleground for competing conceptions of parenthood
outside of marriage. Part III explores how unmarried fathers of
color presented constitutional claims that reflected the
intertwined impact of race, national origin, gender, and class, with
little success. The Article concludes by assessing the
consequences of constitutional law’s erasure of the intersectional
experiences that spurred family status equality claims.
I. THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE IN
WELFARE AND ILLEGITIMACY CASES
No educated observer of the politics of public assistance and
nonmarital childbearing in the 1960s could fail to acknowledge

1. Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family,
103 CAL. L. REV. 1277 (2015) [hereinafter Marital Supremacy]; Serena Mayeri, Foundling
Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental Rights in the Age of Equality, 125 YALE L.J. 2292
(2016) [hereinafter Foundling Fathers].
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the significance of race for welfare and family policy. In the
preceding decades, African American women and children
gained access to Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) funds
formerly reserved for the presumptively white “deserving poor,”
and political resistance intensified accordingly.2 In the years after
Brown, resistance to racial desegregation efforts frequently took
the form of moral regulations targeting “illegitimacy,” as legal
historian Anders Walker has shown.3 Proposed legislation at the
state and local level included the denial of public assistance,
institutionalization of nonmarital children, and sterilization and
imprisonment of their parents.4 The most notorious of these
retaliatory measures, Louisiana’s 1960 “suitable home” law,
purged thousands of “illegitimate” black children from welfare
rolls and sparked a national outcry.5 Winifred Bell’s influential
1965 study, Aid to Dependent Children, left no doubt of the
connections between massive resistance and punitive anti-welfare
measures.6 The Moynihan Report, released the same year,
solidified popular understandings of a connection between family
structure, poverty, and violence.7 By 1968, journalist Fred P.
Graham wrote that “‘[i]llegitimacy,’ like ‘crime in the streets,’ is
becoming a substitute in many minds for the ‘Negro problem.’”8
Child welfare advocates had long criticized illegitimacy
penalties for unjustly imposing crippling legal disabilities and
social stigma upon nonmarital children.9 Civil rights advances
provided new constitutional weapons against such laws; racial
discrimination seemed an apt description of illegitimacy penalties’
purpose and impact, as well as a useful analogue to illegitimacybased discrimination. In a series of lawsuits beginning with Levy
v. Louisiana, family law professor and scholar of illegitimacy

2. See, e.g., JENNIFER MITTELSTADT, FROM WELFARE TO WORKFARE 43–48
(2005).
3. See ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW 5–6 (2009).
4. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1286 & n.30.
5. See, e.g., MITTELSTADT, supra note 2, at 86–91. I use the terms “legitimate” and
“illegitimate” without any wish to endorse their denigration of nonmarital families. For a
fuller explanation of this usage, please see Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at
1279 n.4.
6. WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN (1965).
7. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action
(1965).
8. Fred P. Graham, It’s Tough to Be Illegitimate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1968, at E10.
9. See, e.g., Justine Wise Polier, Illegitimate!, WOMEN’S HOME COMPANION, Aug.
1947, at 32.
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Harry Krause collaborated with lawyers at the ACLU and
NAACP Legal Defense Fund to attack discrimination against
illegitimate children in wrongful death recovery, inheritance, and
workers’ compensation.10 Plaintiffs in these early cases were, to a
person, African American mothers and children from the South.
LDF lawyers specifically requested in Levy that Krause
“show the court that many policies which on their face are
designed to control ‘morals’ or which bear heaviest on the poor,
have a profound impact on the Negro community, which has a
high rate of illegitimacy and poverty.”11 Accordingly, Krause’s
amicus brief for the LDF enumerated how “disproportionately
more Negro children than white children are born out of
wedlock,” and adoption rates for white children were orders of
magnitude higher.12 As a result, “95.8 percent of all persons
affected by discrimination against illegitimates under the
[challenged Louisiana wrongful death] statute are Negroes . . .
.[T]he classification of illegitimacy . . . is a euphemism for
discrimination against Negroes.”13 All of the briefs supporting
Louise Levy’s children framed the central injustice of their
exclusion from recovery for her wrongful death as the punishment
of innocent children for their parents’ illicit conduct.14
No coordinated strategy guided the illegitimacy cases to the
Supreme Court.15 Welfare rights advocates, however, deliberately
chose cases involving racially invidious intent and effect,
employing a “southern strategy” designed to highlight especially
egregious civil rights abuses.16 Sylvester Smith’s challenge to
Alabama’s “substitute father” regulation, which denied public
10. For more on Krause, see Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the
Illegitimacy Family, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 92–94 (2003); Mayeri, Marital Supremacy,
supra note 1, at 1288–90; Harry D. Krause, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 667 (1997).
11. Letter from Leroy Clark, NAACP LDF, to Harry Krause, University of Illinois
School of Law, Dec. 4, 1967, at 1, Norman Dorsen Papers, Box 32, Folder 13.
12. Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund as Amicus Curiae at 18,
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1967) (No. 508), 1968 WL 112827.
13. Id. Norman Dorsen and his ACLU colleagues argued that classifications based
on birth status, like those based on race, should be subject to strict scrutiny. Brief for
Appellants, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (No. 508), 1967 WL 113865.
14. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1292.
15. The NAACP, LDF, and the ACLU were repeat players in the early illegitimacy
litigation, and legal aid lawyers later participated in many of the cases, but no concerted
effort brought “test cases” to the Supreme Court; instead, cases arose more or less
organically. For more, see Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1343–44.
16. MARTHA DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 56 (1993).
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assistance to mothers suspected of extramarital sexual
relationships, included arguments about racially discriminatory
purpose and effect lifted from the Levy briefs.17 Welfare rights
advocates pressed race discrimination claims outside the South as
well, advancing similar arguments in New Jersey Welfare Rights
Organization v. Cahill, which challenged a requirement of
“ceremonial marriage” for cohabiting couples to be eligible for
certain public assistance benefits.18
Though some lower court opinions engaged plaintiffs’ race
discrimination arguments, none of the welfare or illegitimacy
cases decided by the Supreme Court in the late 1960s mentioned
race. In King v. Smith, the three-judge federal district court
acknowledged evidence of racially discriminatory purpose and
effect in a footnote, but did not rest its equal protection holding
on those grounds. The lower court praised the state’s reluctance
to “underwrite financially or approve situations which are
generally considered immoral” as “laudable,” but noted that
“punishment under the regulation is against needy children, not
against the participants in the conduct condemned by the
regulation.”19 The Supreme Court adopted a similar approach to
decide the case on statutory grounds, with Chief Justice Warren
careful “to emphasize” that states remained free to “discourag[e]
illicit sexual behavior and illegitimacy . . . by other means, subject
to constitutional limitations” he did not specify.20
By 1972, political shifts on and off the Court had devalued
the currency of race discrimination arguments, especially those
that relied primarily on disparate impact. When Willie Mae
Weber and her children challenged the exclusion of illegitimate
children from the Louisiana workers’ compensation statute’s
definition of “child” after their father’s death in a job-related
accident, they were represented by Vanue Lacour, an
accomplished young civil rights attorney and one of the few
African Americans practicing law in Louisiana. When Lacour
wrote to the ACLU to ask for assistance as amicus, he specifically
requested “an emphasis on the fact that the practical effect of the
17. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1298.
18. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973). Martha Davis
writes that welfare rights advocates retreated from the “southern strategy” in the late
1960s, and focused resources mostly on Northern states. DAVIS, supra note 16, at 68–69.
19. Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31, 39–40 (M.D. Ala. 1967), aff’d, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
20. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333–34 (1968).
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law . . . is to discriminate against black people.”21 The ACLU’s
brief, however, did not reiterate the race discrimination claims
prominent in previous illegitimacy litigation. And Justice Lewis F.
Powell Jr.’s much-quoted opinion for the Court in Weber v. Aetna
Casualty wholeheartedly embraced the theory that illegitimacybased classifications were unconstitutional because they punished
“hapless” children for the “irresponsible liaisons” of their
parents.22 Discrimination against illegitimate children was an
“illogical” and “unjust” means of deterring illicit adult sex; the
state’s goal of promoting marriage itself posed no constitutional
problem.23
Though Justice Powell, new to the Court, might not have
been exposed to the race- and poverty-based discrimination
arguments prominent in the earlier illegitimacy cases, he did
consider—and reject—such claims in the welfare context. Welfare
rights strategists hoped Jefferson v. Hackney would establish that
inadequate public assistance provision not only contravened the
Social Security Act but also discriminated against people of color
in violation of the equal protection clause.24 Whereas public
assistance programs for the (predominantly white, Anglo) elderly
and disabled provided close to one hundred percent of what the
federal government deemed basic subsistence needs, Texas
AFDC recipients, more than eighty percent of whom were
African American and Mexican American single mothers and
nonmarital children, received less than half of the subsistence
standard.25 Plaintiffs attacked these disparities as unconstitutional
discrimination based on race and family status: the Center for
Social Welfare Policy and Law’s brief cited Bell’s study and
highlighted past attempts by Southern states to punish nonmarital
births through criminalization, denial of benefits, and suitable
home and substitute parent regulations. Texas, in particular, “was

21. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1306.
22. Weber v. Aetna, 406 U.S. 164, 176, 183 (1972). For more on Weber, see Mayeri,
Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1305–10.
23. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1307–08 (quoting Weber v. Aetna,
406 U.S. 164, 175–76).
24. Welfare rights advocates brought a case similar to Jefferson v. Hackney in Ohio.
See PREMILLA NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES 61 (2005).
25. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 558 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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a prime and vigorous perpetrator” of such racially motivated
measures.26
Justice Powell, perhaps the most likely swing vote in
Jefferson, did not think much of the constitutional race
discrimination argument.27 His clerk Hamilton P. Fox III viewed
disparate impact analysis as a dangerous slippery slope. “If the
Court measures racial discrimination entirely by impact,” Fox
wrote, “then the Court would compel lawmakers and
administrators to take into account racial balance in every
situation.” Racial impact was not “irrelevant,” in Fox’s view, “but
its relevance is that it tends to show motivation and purpose.”28
Fox saw no such evidence of purpose in the record, and he
believed the discrepancies had a rational basis: whereas the aged
and disabled largely were incapable of supporting themselves,
AFDC recipients might be encouraged to work and reduce their
“dependency” on public funds. Fox found this logic neither
“intelligent” nor “humane,” but “reluctant[ly]” concluded that
the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims should be rejected. Powell
apparently agreed with Fox’s constitutional conclusion, though he
ultimately declined to follow his clerk’s recommendation that the
Court find for the plaintiffs on statutory grounds.
Coming on the heels of other welfare rights defeats, the
Court’s 5-4 decision in Jefferson sounded the death knell for racebased disparate impact claims in welfare cases, and hastened the
demise of poverty lawyers’ attempt to constitutionalize welfare
rights.29 Once central to the constitutional case against
illegitimacy classifications and to welfare rights activists’
26. Brief for Appellants, Jefferson v. Hackney, 30–36 (citing Bell, Aid to Dependent
Children). Davis writes that welfare rights strategist Ed Sparer recommended positioning
Jefferson as the first equal protection case to reach the Supreme Court because of its
“dramatic and egregious facts” relative to contemporaneous cases. DAVIS, supra note 16,
at 134.
27. Justice Harry Blackmun, who, like Powell, had recently joined the Court, had
written his first opinion in a welfare case, Wyman v. James, rejecting the plaintiff’s claims.
See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE
BLACKMUN 61–62 (2005).
28. Hamilton P. Fox III, Bench Memo, Jefferson v. Hackney [406 U.S. 535], on file
with the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers, 1921-1998, Ms 001, Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives,
Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA [hereinafter Powell Papers], Box 370,
Folder 28.
29. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding restrictions on
welfare benefits to large families against equal protection challenge); Wyman, 400 U.S. 309
(upholding caseworker searches of AFDC recipients’ homes against constitutional
challenge). See also DAVIS, supra note 16, at 134.
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constitutional strategy, by the early 1970s race-based disparate
impact arguments faded into the background of the Court’s
welfare and illegitimacy jurisprudence. In both contexts, when the
Court found for plaintiffs, it did so in the name of protecting
needy children, rather than vindicating claims of racial or
economic justice for adults and their families.
II. SEXUAL CITIZENSHIP, ECONOMIC JUSTICE, AND
INTERSECTIONAL EXPERIENCE
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a new generation of feminist
and welfare rights critiques challenged the child-focused account
of illegitimacy penalties’ harm and focused attention on how
punishing nonmarital childbearing and nonmarital children
subordinated adult women—especially women of color, and poor
and low-income women—impeding their sexual and reproductive
autonomy, their economic independence, and their ability to care
for their families.
African American women as individuals and as activists in
the grassroots welfare rights movement struggled against the
racist, sexist dehumanization of welfare recipients, prominently
including the state’s intrusion on the personal and sexual lives of
black single mothers. Sylvester Smith’s challenge to Alabama’s
substitute father law not only underscored the racial motivations
and effects of punitive anti-illegitimacy welfare measures, but also
advanced a robust vision of sexual autonomy and privacy. Smith
resisted conventional notions of respectability: when told that her
family would be ineligible for ADC benefits if she did not
disprove rumors of her intimate relations with a married father of
nine children, Smith adamantly refused to confirm or deny the
affair. “I told [the caseworker] it was none of her business,” Smith
later recalled, adding that she had every intention of “going with”
whomever she wished as long as she was young enough to enjoy
the company of men.30 Smith, who worked daily eight-hour shifts
as a cook in Selma for less than twenty dollars per week to support
her four children and one grandchild, valued her social and sexual
autonomy enough to risk losing the stingy but significant ADC
benefit for which her family was eligible.31
30. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1297.
31. For more, see Rickie Solinger, The First Welfare Case: Money, Sex, Marriage, and
White Supremacy in Selma, 1966: A Reproductive Justice Analysis, 22 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 13
(2010).
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Smith’s defiant declaration of sexual independence did not
translate perfectly into legal or constitutional claims, but her
arguments sounded in terms of sexual privacy and the right not to
have government benefits conditioned upon marriage or
celibacy.32 Her lawyer, Martin Garbus, argued that the substitute
father regulation, by requiring mothers to disclose their “most
intimate relationships,” violated her rights to privacy and freedom
of association.33 ACLU lawyers who litigated the early
illegitimacy cases made supportive arguments outside of court: in
1967, Norman Dorsen, David Rudovsky, and John “Chip” Gray
argued for an expansive interpretation of Griswold v. Connecticut
to “include [all] private sexual activity between consenting
adults,” and suggested that “the right of government to prohibit
or discourage ‘immoral’ conduct which damages no other public
interest has been seriously challenged.”34 In 1969, Rudovsky and
Gray interpreted Levy and its companion case, Glona v.
American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company, to require
strict judicial scrutiny of laws that discriminated against the
parents of nonmarital children.35 The Court’s 1972 decision in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, invalidating a contraceptive ban for
unmarried individuals, encouraged civil libertarians and feminists
to hope for an expansive interpretation of sexual and
reproductive freedom outside the bonds of marriage.36
The declining fortunes of race-based constitutional disparate
impact claims, poverty-based equal protection claims and the
welfare rights movement coincided with the rise of feminist legal
advocacy and the emergence of constitutional sex equality law in
the early 1970s. Feminist lawyers and commentators offered a
sharp critique of the approach promoted by Harry Krause and
embraced by the Court, which framed the primary harm of
illegitimacy penalties as their injury to blameless children
powerless to prevent parental misconduct. Young lawyers Patricia
Tenoso and Aleta Wallach wrote in 1974 of “an independent
justification for abolition of illegitimacy: the right of women to
self-determination requires that they be free from all forms of
32. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1298.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1296–97 (quoting Norman Dorsen & David Rudovsky, Comment, Equality
for the Illegitimate?, WELFARE L. BULL., May 1967, at 15).
35. John C. Gray Jr. & David Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate,
118 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1969).
36. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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male domination.”37 They excoriated Krause’s focus on
ascertaining paternity and extracting child support from
biological fathers, contending that state policy should instead
“treat the mother as an economic resource” by “eliminat[ing]
barriers to [] employment” for unmarried mothers and
guaranteeing “adequate governmental support of all unmarried
mothers and their children.”38 “Illegitimacy,” they contended, was
only a problem because law and society made it so; patriarchy and
poverty were the true culprits.39
Like some welfare rights advocates, feminists such as
Wallach and Tenoso questioned the foundational premises of
marital supremacy, including the two-parent nuclear family’s
superiority, the undesirability of nonmarital childbearing, and the
privatization of dependency.40 Constitutional litigation was not a
medium ideally suited to translating such revolutionary critiques
into action. Nevertheless, plaintiffs and their advocates advanced
feminist arguments that illegitimacy penalties imposed a
disproportionate economic and social burden upon women,
especially the poor women of color who dominated the ranks of
nonmarital motherhood: Katie Mae Andrews and four other
African American women who lost or were refused jobs as
teachers by a white superintendent in a rural Mississippi school
district because they had children “out of wedlock”;41 Linda
Gomez, who challenged a Texas law exempting fathers of
nonmarital children from child support obligations;42 the women
threatened by Connecticut and other states with fines and
imprisonment as well as the denial of public assistance for refusing
to disclose the identity of their children’s fathers;43 Jessie Trimble,
37. Aleta Wallach & Patricia Tenoso, A Vindication of the Rights of Unmarried
Women and Their Children: An Analysis of the Institution of Illegitimacy, Equal Protection,
and the Uniform Parentage Act, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 23, 25 (1974).
38. Patricia Tenoso & Aleta Wallach, Book Review, 19 UCLA L. Rev. 845, 850
(1972).
39. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1312 (citing Wallach and Tenoso).
40. On privatized dependency, see, for example, MARTHA FINEMAN, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH-CENTURY
TRAGEDIES 167–68 (1995); Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds,
and the Privatization of Dependency, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 415 (2005).
41. See Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 1973),
aff’d, 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 820 (1975), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 425 U.S. 559 (1976).
42. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam).
43. See Doe v. Norton, 356 F. Supp. 202, 206 n.6 (D. Conn. 1973), supplemented, 365
F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973), vacated sub nom. Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975).
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Lois Fernandez, and fellow plaintiffs in lawsuits attacking
discriminatory inheritance laws in Illinois and Pennsylvania;44
Margaret Gonzales, who contested the exclusion of unmarried
mothers from Social Security survivors’ benefits.45
Plaintiffs and their lawyers emphasized how illegitimacy
penalties often forced women to bear most or all of the economic
burden of supporting nonmarital children after fathers died or
deserted their families; how such laws shamed and punished
women for illicit sex while allowing men to escape the
consequences with impunity; and how denying jobs, child support
payments, government benefits, and inheritance rights to
nonmarital families effectively restricted women’s reproductive
autonomy by penalizing their decision to bear and raise
nonmarital children. They protested when illegitimacy penalties
continued the tradition of invasively patrolling poor women’s
personal lives by conditioning sustenance on the disclosure of
sexual relationships or paternity.
Some of these cases were obviously and explicitly entwined
with the struggle for racial justice. In Andrews v. Drew Municipal
Separate School District, Superintendent George F. Pettey
presided over a school district that had mightily resisted
desegregation; most white families had decamped to “segregation
academies,” leaving the schools more than eighty percent black
but the ranks of teachers and administrators increasingly
dominated by whites. The disparate impact of excluding
nonmarital parents was unmistakable: all five of the rejected
applicants were African American women, and as many as forty
percent of Drew’s African American students were born to
unmarried parents. The school district’s attorney was
segregationist Senator James O. Eastland’s son-in-law, and he
called a once-prominent defender of racial segregation, Ernest
van den Haag, to testify. Andrews’s attorney, Charles Victor
McTeer, a twenty-four-year-old African American protégé of the
Center for Constitutional Rights’ Morty Stavis, enlisted social
psychologist Kenneth Clark and civil rights icon Fannie Lou
Hamer to testify on behalf of the plaintiffs. District Court Judge
William Keady certified Mrs. Hamer as an expert on the “social
mores of the black community.” Briefs submitted by McTeer, by
44. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
45. See Boles v. Califano, 464 F. Supp. 408 (W.D. Tex. 1978), rev’d, 443 U.S. 282
(1979).
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feminist lawyers Nancy Stearns and Rhonda Copelon at CCR,
and amici including the Equal Rights Advocates and ACLU
Women’s Rights Project made race as well as sex discrimination
arguments against the exclusion of unmarried mothers from
employment. Indeed, the plaintiffs’ equal protection argument
was explicitly intersectional, requesting that the Justices apply
strict scrutiny because the case implicated so many different rights
and theories.46
In other cases, although everyone understood that the law’s
impact would fall disproportionately on women of color, race was
less a constitutional hook than a subtly invoked subtext. Their
private correspondence makes clear that child welfare advocates
and their allies understood Roe v. Norton, the challenge to
Connecticut’s punitive mandatory paternity disclosure law, as
part of a larger campaign for racial and economic justice. Jessie
and Deta Mona Trimble’s lawyers made race as well as sex
discrimination arguments when challenging Illinois’s inheritance
laws in state court, but apparently dropped the race-based
disparate impact arguments on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The legal aid and poverty lawyers who challenged the exclusion
of illegitimate children and their parents from Social Security
benefits noted the laws’ race-based disparate impact, but by the
mid-1970s constitutional disparate impact claims based on race,
especially in the context of federal government benefits, seemed
like a non-starter after decisions in cases such as Washington v.
Davis (1976) confirmed that the Court would require proof of
discriminatory intent to prove an equal protection violation.47
Bringing race to the surface of illegitimacy penalty cases
involved risks as well as benefits. On the one hand, judges who
were sympathetic to the civil rights cause or frustrated with the
intransigence of white segregationist resisters might view
evidence of racially disparate impact as sufficient to suggest
actionable discriminatory intent. Judges like William Keady of
Mississippi, who confronted pitched battles over school
desegregation the moment he ascended the bench in 1968, could
46. For in-depth discussions of Andrews, see Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note
1, at 1316, 1319–20; SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND
THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION ch. 5 (2011).
47. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney (1979);
MAYERI supra note 46, at ch. 4; Katie Eyer, Ideological Drift and the Forgotten History of
Intent, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 50–55 (2016).
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hardly fail to recognize what was at stake when he received racist
hate mail excoriating him for endorsing “[h]eifers” “breeding kids
out of wedlock” at taxpayer expense. 48 On the other hand,
advocates did not wish to suggest that African Americans adhered
to different moral standards than whites, or that black
communities condoned the “schoolgirl pregnancies” that were the
ostensible target of school administrators’ exclusionary policies.
Sensitive to this delicate balance, social psychologist Kenneth
Clark emphasized in his Andrews testimony that sexual mores and
behavior did not differ appreciably along racial lines: black and
white Americans alike regularly defied moral proscriptions
against nonmarital sex. Rather, he contended, poor African
American youth lacked access to contraception and to
information about preventing pregnancy.49 Fannie Lou Hamer’s
testimony excoriated whites’ sexual hypocrisy in laymen’s terms:
if the school district excluded all employees, white and black, who
had ever engaged in nonmarital sex, “lock up the doors. There
won’t be any school.”50
Some of the protagonists in illegitimacy penalty cases sought
to conform as best they could to existing normative ideals; some
rejected the politics of respectability altogether; and still others
sought to redefine its terms. At one end of this spectrum,
attorneys for the Levy children portrayed their mother Louise,
who died of hypertensive uremia after a negligent misdiagnosis in
a segregated New Orleans hospital, as a paragon of maternal
piety, devotion, and self-sufficiency.51 Briefs noted that she
labored as a domestic worker to send her children to Catholic
school and did not depend on welfare.52 Ms. Levy, this depiction
implied, threatened neither the public fisc nor the availability of
low-wage labor; her educational choices did not even evoke the
specter of public school desegregation. Indeed, attorney Adolph
Levy (no relation) emphasized that if the Levy children were
denied recovery for their mother’s wrongful death, “the tortfeasor

48. MAYERI supra note 46, at 157–58.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 151.
51. Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy? 20 AM. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 387, 395 (2012); see also Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1290.
52. See Murray, supra note 51, at 395.
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need reimburse no one. The State must support the tragic
victims.”53
At the opposite end of the spectrum were women who
celebrated sexual liberty and viewed single parenthood as a
laudable choice, not a regrettable mistake. Sylvester Smith
staunchly defended her right to receive aid from the state without
divulging her personal business to a caseworker and without
forswearing extramarital sex or male companionship. Whereas
Katie Mae Andrews and Lestine Rogers, the named plaintiffs in
Andrews, presented themselves as churchgoing Sunday school
teachers who had become parents because of ignorance or
inability to access birth control, teacher’s aide applicant Violet
Burnett unapologetically refused to condemn premarital sex or to
model abstinence to her students. When asked how she would
counsel a student about engaging in (nonmarital) sexual
intercourse, Burnett replied that she saw no harm in it, and would
advise students to do as they pleased.54 Lois Fernandez, an
African American community activist from Philadelphia who
sued and lobbied to persuade Pennsylvania’s governor and
legislature to abolish many of the legal disabilities associated with
illegitimacy, spoke proudly of single parenthood as a morally valid
choice worthy of equal dignity.55 Fernandez actively fought the
“stereotype that mothers of out of wedlock children are
promiscuous,” and resisted community norms prescribing that
children should be given their father’s surname.56
Many plaintiffs and their advocates neither embraced nor
wholly rejected prevailing social and sexual norms, but instead
worked to redefine respectability itself by rehabilitating the image
of unmarried motherhood. When Mississippi school officials
argued that unmarried parents set a poor moral example for their
impressionable students, the plaintiffs and their allies countered
with a robust defense of single mothers’ courage, fortitude, and
moral character that emphasized their valiant efforts to obtain
education and employment against all odds. Women like Katie
Mae Andrews were admirable role models: college graduates who
53. Petitions for Writs of Certiorari and Review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth
Circuit, State of Louisiana, at 4, Levy v. State, 193 So.2d 530 (La. 1967) (No. 48518),
collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 32, Folder 14.
54. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1342.
55. Stephen Franklin, Mother Wins Fight To End Stigma of Illegitimacy, THE
BULLETIN, Dec. 10, 1978, GB3.
56. Id.
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sought meaningful employment in order to support themselves
and their children. Rather than relying on paltry public assistance
benefits to supplement the dead-end, low-wage menial labor
traditionally available to African American women, Andrews and
her compatriots lifted themselves and their children out of
poverty. Fannie Lou Hamer admonished white school officials for
placing women like Andrews in a catch-22: “[W]hen you say we
are lifting ourselves up and you tell us to get off of welfare, then
when peoples try to go to school to get off of welfare to support
themselves, this is another way of knocking them down.”57 Mae
Bertha Carter, the married mother of thirteen children who had
almost single-handedly integrated the Drew, Mississippi schools,
lent her moral stature to the plaintiffs’ cause, testifying that she
would be proud to see Ms. Andrews teach her children.58
The redefinition of sexual citizenship by women of color
expanded the scope of reproductive autonomy to include the right
to give birth to and raise children regardless of financial means,
marital status, or the presence of a man in the household. In the
early 1970s, as abortion restrictions fell and women of color and
their allies exposed and protested involuntary sterilization,
plaintiffs and their lawyers emphasized that the right to
reproductive choice included the right to have children as well as
the right not to have them. Some, like Andrews and Hamer,
personally opposed or had religious objections to abortion.
Hamer had experienced and remonstrated against coerced
hysterectomies and tubal ligations, known as “Mississippi
appendectomies” thanks to her advocacy. Such abuses, which
occurred without women’s knowledge or consent, or were
required as a condition of receiving medical care or public
assistance, were hardly confined to Mississippi; less drastic
penalties for nonmarital childbearing such as employment
restrictions and denials of public assistance, were even more
widespread. Whereas abortion rights jurisprudence highlighted
the right not to bear children, and still bore the imprint of
population control, feminists in CCR and in grassroots

57. See Appendix at 102, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559
(No. 74-1318).
58. Id. at 113–14.
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organizations representing women of color advanced a broader
reproductive justice agenda.59
This vision of sexual citizenship also encompassed women’s
prerogative to make independent decisions about their families
and households without state interference, to exercise rights
commensurate with their responsibilities. The women who
challenged Connecticut’s mandatory paternity disclosure law in
Roe v. Norton confronted disapprobation for depriving their
children of paternal financial support and a relationship with their
fathers: “Why,” asked the state attorney general, “should a
mother be permitted, by her inaction, to cast her child into the
eternal caverns of illegitimacy[?]”60 Federal district court Judge
M. Joseph Blumenfeld, liberal reputation notwithstanding,
castigated “recalcitrant mother[s]” for acting against the interests
of their “innocent children,” and upheld the statute as
“operat[ing] prophylactically against the adverse differential
treatment which the unwed mothers would impose on their
children.”61 Women forced to identify their children’s father or
face imprisonment protested both the intrusion on their personal
privacy and the implication that they were not best positioned to
assess their children’s best interests. For some women, they
insisted, keeping paternity private was the most responsible
decision they could make for their families; the alternative,
several women testified, was to risk physical violence. Others
worried that holding a former sexual partner legally liable for
child support would cause a voluntarily involved father to flee, or
disrupt an impending marriage to another man willing to adopt
the mother’s children. Child welfare experts warned that forcing
an unwilling mother to identify her child’s father would cause
material and psychic harm to the child, hardly ever outweighed by
the often- illusory promise of material or affective support.62
Prominent pediatric psychiatrist Albert Solnit testified that
incarcerating mothers would be “catastrophic” for children, and,
moreover, that “the one who has the care and the responsibility
59. See, e.g., JENNIFER NELSON, WOMEN OF COLOR IN THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (2003); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY (1997); JAEL
SILLIMAN ET AL., UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZING FOR
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE (2004).
60. Brief of the Appellee at 10, Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975) (No. 73-6033),
1974 WL 186124.
61. Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 72, 79, 79 n. 23 (D. Conn. 1973).
62. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1321.
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and the loving affectionate bond” was the ablest and most
deserving judge of her child’s best interests.63
Perhaps even more than plaintiffs, advocates who opposed
illegitimacy penalties varied widely in their attitudes toward
sexual and family autonomy, sex equality, and the political
economy of reproduction, parenthood and poverty. To some
degree, this was a matter of context, emphasis, and strategy. When
advocates could frame the plaintiffs’ position as consistent with
the privatization of dependency, they understandably did. For
instance, in cases involving employment discrimination, child
support, and inheritance law, lawyers often reminded courts that
without income from a job or private financial support from a
living or deceased father, women and their children would place
a burden on the public fisc. Such arguments had less purchase, of
course, when finding for the plaintiffs would increase public
assistance costs, as in the mandatory paternity disclosure cases.
There, advocates argued that government officials’ professed
solicitude for innocent children masked their real aims of
minimizing public welfare expenditures and punishing poor
women for nonmarital childbearing.
But advocates who opposed illegitimacy penalties also
disagreed more fundamentally about family, poverty, and welfare
policy. At one end of the spectrum were adherents of the
Moynihanian ethos who saw nonmarital childbearing and
“matriarchal” family structure as inherently problematic, if not
pathological. To them, “illegitimacy” was both a “psychic
catastrophe,” in the words of one often-quoted scholar, and a
devastating social scourge. These advocates recognized and
condemned punitive anti-illegitimacy laws as cruel and racist, but
saw their impact on blameless children as the primary harm they
wrought. They prioritized the restoration of African American
men to their normative roles as breadwinners, husbands, and
fathers; to the extent poor men were unable to take their proper
place as heads of households, measures to identify and hold them
responsible for financial support could at least mitigate the social,
economic, and psychological devastation of fatherlessness. At the
other end of the spectrum were feminist and welfarist advocates
who emphasized women’s sexual, reproductive, and economic
autonomy, truly equal employment opportunity and access to
63.

Id. (quoting Albert Solnit).
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good jobs but also the freedom to devote themselves to family
care without being forced to depend upon a man for financial
support.
Between these poles, advocates held varying views of the
state’s proper role in creating the conditions necessary for women
and their families to enjoy freedom and equality. Herbert
Semmel, a poverty lawyer who later argued unsuccessfully in the
Supreme Court that mothers of nonmarital children should be
eligible for Social Security survivors’ benefits, believed the
emerging emphasis on child support enforcement to be
misguided. With anthropologist Carol Stack, who studied
extended kin networks in impoverished black communities,
Semmel argued in 1973 that “[l]arge-scale efforts to seek
contributions from nonsupporting fathers would do little or
nothing to help dependent AFDC children” because poor black
fathers lacked the job opportunities and resources to make more
than sporadic voluntary financial contributions and aggressive
enforcement efforts would likely discourage “sorely needed
material, psychological and social support which would otherwise
be forthcoming from the father and his kin.”64 When low-income
fathers did pay child support, such monies went directly to the
state as reimbursements or offsets of AFDC funds; mothers and
children did not benefit. Ultimately, Stack and Semmel
concluded, a “national income maintenance program should offer
assistance to all needy persons,” regardless of family status or the
presence of children in the household; to do otherwise would fail
to serve communities in which shifting networks of neighbors and
kin provided care and support to families.65 Harry Krause, in
contrast, prioritized paternity determinations and embraced
enhanced enforcement efforts: he contended that state and local
governments simply could not meet the needs of the growing
population of single parent households with public funds, and thus
strengthening child support collection was a public policy
imperative.66

64. Carol B. Stack & Herbert Semmel, The Concept of the Family in the Poor Black
Community, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC WELFARE, PAPER NO. 12 (PART II): THE FAMILY,
POVERTY, AND WELFARE PROGRAMS, S. COMM. ON FISCAL POL’Y, 93RD CONG. 294
(Comm. Print 1973).
65. Id. at 305.
66. Harry D. Krause, Child Welfare, Parental Responsibility, and the State, in
STUDIES IN PUBLIC WELFARE, supra note 64, at 273–74.
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By the 1980s, Krause’s vision had triumphed, due in part to a
convergence between longstanding attempts to penalize
nonmarital sex by holding poor and low-income men of color
financially responsible for the children of their sexual partners;
the efforts of some feminists to hold fathers responsible postdivorce; the conservative fiscal imperative to privatize
dependency; and the rise of the divorced fathers’ rights
movement, which conceded child support obligations in exchange
for formal sex equality in custody rights.67 These forces buffeted
unmarried fathers, largely unorganized and often poor; even
those who brought constitutional parental rights claims all the
way to the U.S. Supreme Court did not do as part of a concerted
or mobilized campaign.68 Nevertheless, in the 1970s and 1980s,
nonmarital parenthood became a key battleground for
disagreements among feminists and anti-poverty advocates over
the role of fathers, mothers, and the state in providing care and
financial support to poor children and families.
III. WHITEWASHING NONMARITAL FATHERHOOD
Like unmarried mothers, nonmarital fathers used
constitutional litigation to seek rights and to rehabilitate their
image. Again, many of the plaintiffs in the early Supreme Court
cases were persons of color and of limited means. As in the
“illegitimacy” suits, the unwed fathers’ cases that reached the
Court did so not as the result of a coordinated strategy but rather
as a matter of chance. The race, class, and gender politics of
fathers’ constitutional claims differed significantly from those of
nonmarital children and their mothers, however. Leon Quilloin,
Abdiel Caban, Curtis Parham, and plaintiffs who challenged
discrimination against nonmarital fathers and children in
citizenship laws in Fiallo v. Bell made sex discrimination claims,
but none so much as mentioned race. Poverty law strategy played
a central role in advocates’ thinking about cases involving
parental rights; feminist organizations, deeply conflicted about
nonmarital fatherhood, largely stayed out of constitutional
67. For an excellent in-depth treatment of the divorced fathers’ rights movement
during this period, see generally Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’
Rights Movement and Family Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. 79 (2016).
68. On the contrast between the mobilized, predominantly white middle class
divorced fathers’ rights movement and unorganized nonmarital fathers, see Mayeri,
Foundling Fathers, supra note 1, at 2373–92.
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litigation in the Supreme Court until the 1980s.69 But by then,
race, poverty, and even sex equality receded almost completely
from the jurisprudence of nonmarital fatherhood.
Whereas “unwed mothers” had long been a focal point of
policymakers’ concern and scholars’ attention, nonmarital fathers
became objects of sustained study only in the 1960s and 1970s.
Efforts to hold impoverished men of color responsible for
supporting their biological children—or the children of their
nonmarital sexual partners—intensified. Rates of nonmarital
cohabitation and childbearing rose; no-fault divorce further
increased the ranks of single fathers and raised questions about
their rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis children. As sex- and
illegitimacy-based classifications became more constitutionally
vulnerable, nonmarital fathers began to assert rights to equal
treatment with mothers and to procedural and substantive due
process as parents.70
The first parental rights case brought by a nonmarital father
to reach the Supreme Court was Peter Stanley’s challenge to an
Illinois law that conclusively presumed nonmarital fathers unfit
without affording them so much as a hearing.71 Though the
Stanley family was white, and court papers contain virtually no
mention of race, race-salient assumptions likely informed the
Justices’ deliberations. Many who opposed parental rights for
men like Stanley worried that affording nonmarital fathers notice
and an opportunity to be heard would thwart adoptions, long
considered the normatively desirable “solution” to unwed
motherhood. But adoption rates varied dramatically by race and
class. In the middle decades of the twentieth century, white
middle-class parents often sent unmarried girls and young women
who became pregnant to maternity homes to give birth, surrender
their children, and return to the routines of teenage life,
preserving their future marriageability and allowing childless

69. I have explored these conflicts in great detail elsewhere. See generally Mayeri,
Foundling Fathers, supra note 1.
70. See id. at Part I.
71. For more on the Stanley case, see Mayeri, Foundling Fathers, supra note 1, at
2309–23; see also Josh Gupta-Kagan, The Strange Life of Stanley v. Illinois: A Case Study
in Parent Representation and Law Reform, 41 N.Y.U. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE (forthcoming);
Josh Gupta-Kagan, Stanley v. Illinois’s Untold Story, 24 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 773
(2016).
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married couples to raise children.72 Adoption was far less common
in communities of color; young African American women,
especially in poor and low-income households, usually expected
to raise their nonmarital children, often with the support and
assistance of their own parents and kin networks.73
Early draft opinions in Stanley appear to reflect these
divergent background narratives. Justice Douglas initially saw the
Illinois law not as “an invidious discrimination against unwed
fathers, but rather a protection of illegitimate children.” Most
unmarried fathers,” he wrote, “are not present at their children’s
births and like hit-and-run drivers are difficult to locate.”
Unmarried mothers, Douglas assumed, usually “decide[d] to
place their offspring in the care of the state.” Children’s best
interests would be served by “swift and certain placement in
adoptive homes,” an outcome that rights for biological fathers
might jeopardize.74
Justice Marshall’s draft reflected a very different
understanding of the underlying social conditions and of the
political economy of impoverished households. The state’s
characterization of nonmarital fathers as presumptively unfit
“suffers from the deficiencies of any stereotype,” Marshall wrote.
“There are many reasons for illegitimacy in our society,” he
continued, including the “structure of state and federal welfare
programs” that “provide[d] financial assistance only to children in
one-parent households.” Accordingly, “a father might decline to
marry the mother of his children in order to maximize the family’s
eligibility for financial assistance.” Indeed, “[i]n such
circumstances, the fact of illegitimacy provides no support
whatever for the inference that the father lacks concern for his
children; indeed, it may tend to suggest the contrary conclusion.”75
Marshall’s opinion in Stanley never saw the light of day
because Justice Byron White’s draft eventually won a majority,
and Marshall joined White’s opinion rather than writing a
72. See generally REGINA KUNZEL, FALLEN WOMEN, PROBLEM GIRLS:
UNMARRIED MOTHERS AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL WORK, 1890–1945
(1993).
73. See RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND
RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE (1993).
74. Mayeri, Foundling Fathers, supra note 1, at 2317.
75. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Draft Opinion in Stanley v. Illinois (manuscript at 5)
(Nov. 1971) (on file with the Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers [hereinafter
Marshall Papers], Box 91, Folder 5).
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separate concurrence. His clerk, Barbara Underwood, had
recently worked on Marshall’s vehement dissent in Jefferson v.
Hackney, however, where Marshall addressed—without passing
judgment on—the constitutional claim of plaintiffs challenging
Texas’s differential funding of AFDC and other public assistance
categories as disproportionately affecting African- and Mexican
American individuals and families. In Jefferson, Marshall
criticized the district court and his own colleagues for glibly
concluding that “the fact that AFDC is politically unpopular and
the fact that AFDC recipients are disfavored by the State and its
citizens, have nothing whatsoever to do with the racial makeup of
the program.”76 In Marshall’s view, “at some point a showing that
state action has a devastating impact on the lives of minority racial
groups must be relevant.”77 Although Marshall’s dissent in
Jefferson did not discuss the plaintiffs’ family status discrimination
claims directly, he cited King v. Smith’s reference to the
community disapproval visited upon AFDC recipients.78 Reading
Marshall’s published Jefferson dissent and unpublished Stanley
opinion together, it seems likely that the racial impact of Illinois’s
exclusion of nonmarital fathers from parental rights was on his
mind.
Despite Justice Marshall’s strong stance against marital
status discrimination in Stanley, Leon Quilloin’s claim to retain
parental rights with respect to his son Darrell did not earn his vote
when it came before the Court six years later. Darrell spent
several years of his early childhood living in Savannah, Quilloin’s
hometown, while Darrell’s mother Ardell worked in New York
and sent money home to help support her son. Court records
suggest that Darrell’s grandmothers provided most of the day-today care for Darrell while he lived in Savannah. Quilloin testified
that he provided some financial support when Darrell was an
infant, including paying for surgery to repair a hernia, and
purchasing milk and clothing; that he had arranged and paid for
Darrell to start kindergarten early at a local Catholic school; and
that he had built a soundproof nursery in the nightclub where he
worked so that his son could spend more time with him.79 When
Darrell was five, he moved to New York to join Ardell, who by
76.
77.
78.
79.

Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 575 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 575–76.
Id. at 575 (discussing King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 322 (1968)).
Mayeri, Foundling Fathers, supra note 1, at 2336.
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then had a new husband and baby son. Quilloin had visited
Darrell in New York, and paid for his son to travel to Georgia for
family visits. While the parties disputed the length and frequency
of these visits, all agreed that Quilloin had given Darrell gifts, such
as a new bicycle, which his mother felt were “disruptive to family
harmony.” Her husband, Randall Walcott, wished to adopt
Darrell and unite the family under a single surname. Recalling his
own absent father, Quilloin testified that he wished to preserve
the “little bond between the kid and myself seldom as it’s been”
and sought visitation.80
There is little mention of race in the record in Quilloin, other
than passing references to Quilloin’s mother Mabel Dawson’s
participation in voter registration drives and get-out-the-vote
campaigns during the mid- to late 1960s, the period when Darrell
lived in Savannah.81 As in the other unwed fathers cases, none of
the briefs argued that laws disadvantaging nonmarital fathers had
a racially disparate impact. Notably, though, the network of
extended family care and support that characterized Darrell’s
early life in Savannah bore a strong resemblance to that of the
family celebrated in a concurring opinion signed by Justices
Brennan and Marshall just a few months earlier, in Moore v. City
of East Cleveland. There, these Justices wrote separately to
emphasize how a city zoning ordinance criminalizing an African
American grandmother for taking her orphaned grandson into
her home denigrated family structures that were especially
common in black communities.82
Moore reflected internal disagreement among the Justices
about the desirability of linking family pluralism with race,
ethnicity, and class. As Marshall wrote privately to his colleagues,
“I cannot agree with [the] conclusion that there is no
constitutionally protected right…for a grandmother to perform

80. Id. at 2336–37.
81. Other sources reveal that Quilloin’s sister, Carolyn Quilloin Coleman,
participated in lunch counter sit-ins protesting segregation while in high school in the early
1960s, became a leader in the NAACP, and much later served as a special assistant to the
governor of North Carolina. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. 2125 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2007)
(statement of Hon. G.K. Butterfield).
82. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Justice Powell, who ultimately authored the majority opinion, wrote in the
margins of Brennan’s first draft: “I see no racial overtones here.” See First Draft of
Dissenting Opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Feb. 14, 1977, Powell Papers, supra
note 28, at Box 458, Folder 16.
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the duties of a mother for her grandchildren. . . . I have seen too
many situations where a strong grandparent literally held the
family together and was responsible for the education and
upbringing of decent, law-abiding youngsters, to agree as a matter
of constitutional law that the ‘nuclear’ family is ‘the basic building
block of our society.’”83 When Marshall incorporated this
sentiment into a draft dissent from what was to be Chief Justice
Burger’s majority opinion upholding the ordinance, he referred to
grandparent involvement as particularly important among
“immigrant groups, the poor, and blacks,” and wrote, “I cannot
agree that the norms of middle-class suburban life set the
standards of constitutional law for all people at all times.” Justice
Powell wrote in the margins: “Nonsense! Middle-class may well
respect the family more than ‘the rich’ or ‘the poor.’ But none of
these generalizations is much more than loose rhetoric.”84 His
clerk, David Martin, “like[d Justice Marshall’s draft] very much,”
but pointed out that “it would not be easy” to join without also
signing Brennan’s opinion, which went on at much greater length
about the importance of extended kin networks in African
American families. Powell replied: “Good—but with racial
overtones, I’ll not join.”85
Unlike the other unwed fathers cases, sex equality arguments
did not play a prominent role in Quilloin. Quilloin sought neither
full custody nor equal standing with Ardell—he “honestly
believe[d] that [Darrell’s] rightful place is with his mother.”
Rather, Quilloin sought to veto Walcott’s adoption of Darrell in
order to prevent the court from rendering him a legal stranger to
83. Justice Thurgood Marshall to Chief Justice Warren Burger (cc: the Conference),
Re: Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Nov. 23, 1976, Powell Papers, supra note 28, at Box
458, Folder 6. Justice Marshall reiterated this view in what was to be a brief, separate
dissent, later withdrawn after a majority of the Court voted to invalidate the ordinance.
See Thurgood Marshall, First Draft of Dissenting Opinion in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, Feb. 16, 1977, Marshall Papers, supra note 75, at Box 194, Folder 2. Justice
Stewart took umbrage at an early draft of Justice Brennan’s opinion, which, Stewart wrote
to his colleagues, “seeks to convey the invidious message that the ordinance…is racially
discriminatory. Nothing could be further from the truth,” Stewart contended, noting, inter
alia, that East Cleveland was “over ninety percent Negro . . . .” See Potter Stewart to the
Conference, Feb. 16, 1977, Marshall Papers, supra note 75, at Box 194, Folder 2.
84. Thurgood Marshall, First Draft of Dissenting Opinion in Moore, Feb. 16, 1977,
Powell Papers, supra note 28, at Box 458, Folder 16.
85. Id.; R.A. Lenhardt, The Color of Kinship, 102 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
For a fascinating and comprehensive discussion of Moore, see R.A. Lenhardt, The Family
as Racial Project: Understanding the Real Lessons of Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 85
FORDHAM L. REV (forthcoming 2017).
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his son: he sought to be treated as a “de facto divorced father.”
Nevertheless, a unanimous Court, in an opinion authored by
Justice Marshall, denied Quilloin’s claim. Quilloin, unlike a father
who had married the mother of his child, or who had lived in the
same household with his family, had never taken legal or actual
responsibility for his son. As applied to Quilloin, then, Georgia’s
statute did not violate equal protection. Whereas in Stanley,
Justice Marshall had grilled the Illinois attorney general about the
relevance of a marriage license to Peter Stanley’s relationship to
his children, in Quilloin he wrote that the state “was not
foreclosed from recognizing” the difference between a divorced
and a never-married father’s “extent of commitment to the
welfare of the child.”86
There are several possible explanations for Justice
Marshall’s—and his colleagues’—lack of sympathy for Leon
Quilloin, none of them mutually exclusive. Melissa Murray has
argued that Quilloin is consistent with the Court’s preference, in
the unwed fathers’ cases, for fathers who act like normative
husbands, providing financial support for their children and living
together with mothers in the same household.87 Further, unlike
Peter Stanley, Quilloin’s adversary was not a state department of
social services proposing to place his child in foster care rather
than with a biological parent, but rather a fit and caring mother
and prospective stepfather who had lived with Darrell for a little
more than half his life. Justice Marshall’s draft opinion in Stanley
was careful to stipulate that “[t]his case does not present the
question whether the father and the mother are entitled to equal
rights in a custody contest between them, and we intimate no
views on that question, which may involve considerations quite
different from those presented by this case.”88
Quilloin therefore presented a host of thorny questions
Stanley had not broached. The ACLU’s internal correspondence
reveals advocates deeply torn over whether to provide amicus
support to Quilloin. On the one hand, civil libertarians and
poverty lawyers increasingly feared that child welfare authorities
removed children from their homes and terminated parental
rights on grounds of neglect when poverty was the real culprit. But
nonmarital fathers’ parental rights, when they conflicted with
86.
87.
88.

Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S 246, 256 (1978).
Murray, supra note 51, at 402–405.
Marshall, supra note 75 (manuscript at 7 n.4).
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mothers’ prerogatives, posed a profound dilemma for many
feminists. For married couples, feminists wholeheartedly
supported egalitarian parenting. But when parents divorced—or
had never been married in the first place—many feminists were
more ambivalent. If a father had been relatively uninvolved in a
child’s care during a relationship, perhaps he did not deserve
equality post-dissolution. And some feminists worried that
mothers, who bore primary responsibility for the care of
nonmarital children, would pay an unfair price for nonmarital
fathers’ rights. The feminist skeptics won this argument in
Quilloin, and the ACLU ultimately declined to file a brief.89
Caban v. Mohammed presented the sex discrimination claim
that Quilloin did not, and Abdiel Caban’s stronger facts—he had
lived for several years with his children and their mother—
attracted amicus support from the ACLU and other groups. After
flirting with language that would have embraced full formal
equality for mothers and fathers, Justice Powell’s opinion for the
Court embraced sex neutrality in circumstances where a
nonmarital father had developed a relationship with his children
comparable to that of their mother.90 Dissenters from the 5-4
decision continued to express concern that rights for nonmarital
fathers would jeopardize newborn adoptions, still considered the
most desirable option for illegitimate children.91
Caban marked the apex of nonmarital fathers’ constitutional
rights in the Supreme Court.92 Subsequently, the Court ignored
cases that presented feminist arguments for sex equality in
nonmarital parental rights and decided the cases that did produce
full opinions narrowly on due process grounds, maintaining
distinctions between fathers based upon marital status. The
Justices never grappled with the central questions that troubled
feminists and poverty lawyers—the subordination of women and
state intrusions on poor families’ autonomy. Instead, the values of
the divorced fathers’ rights movement and traditionalist
advocates of adoption animated the Court’s jurisprudence.93

89. Mayeri, Foundling Fathers, supra note 1, at 2338–40.
90. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
91. Caban, 441 U.S. at 394–401 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 401–17 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
92. For more on Caban, see Mayeri, Foundling Fathers, supra note 1, at 2342–48.
93. Id. at 2378–82.
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Ironically, the Court consistently rejected claims from
nonmarital fathers that reflected the experiences of unmarried
parents of color caring for children, and did not involve the
feminist dilemma posed by the competing claims of a mother. In
Fiallo v. Bell, the plaintiffs were fathers and nonmarital children
denied certain beneficial exemptions available to mothers and
their nonmarital children and to married parents and their
children under the Immigration and Nationality Act: Dominican
national Ramon Fiallo-Sone, whose U.S. citizen son Ramon
Martin Fiallo could not ease his father’s path to legal residency or
confer exemption from immigration quotas as he could have if his
parents had married or if he had been Fiallo’s mother; Serge
Warner, the West Indian-born son of a naturalized U.S. citizen
father, Cleophus Warner, who could not bypass the quota system
to become a permanent resident, as he could have done if his
mother had been a U.S. citizen, or if his parents had married; and
teenagers Trevor and Earl Wilson, permanent U.S. residents
whose Jamaican father Arthur Cecil Wilson could not obtain a
visa to move to the United States after their mother’s death,
though a mother or a “legitimate” father could have done so.94
The named plaintiffs in Fiallo had undertaken nontraditional
gender roles not unlike the married couples Ruth Bader Ginsburg
represented in the canonical constitutional sex equality cases of
the 1970s. According to court papers, Fiallo-Sone “assumed the
role of primary caretaker and constant companion to his son”
shortly after the child was born in New York in 1971, while the
child’s mother, Celia Rodriguez, “assumed the role of breadwinner.”95 When the class action challenging the discriminatory
statute and regulations was filed in 1974, Fiallo was “a pre-school
age child” and “very dependent upon and attached to his father,”
with whom he lived in Brooklyn.96 For her part, Rodriguez
continued to support the family financially, and “believe[d] that it
[was] in the best interests of the child to live with his father in the
United States.” Short of Fiallo-Sone adopting his son, or marrying
Rodriguez—to neither of which Rodriguez would consent97—no

94. Id. at 2328.
95. Amended Complaint, Fiallo v. Saxbe, Civ. No. 74 C 1083 (E.D.N.Y.), in Joint
Appendix at 6, Fiallo v. Bell., 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
96. Id.
97. Court papers explain simply that, “For personal reasons, Ramon Fiallo-Sone and
Celia Francisca Michel Rodriguez have never married.” Brief for Appellants at 10, Fiallo.
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path to “legitimation” existed. Accordingly, Fiallo-Sone, who had
tried and failed to obtain the otherwise necessary labor
certification, would be unable legally to remain in the United
States with his son.98
Like Stephen Wiesenfeld, who sought Social Security
survivors’ benefits to care for his newborn after his wife Paula, the
household’s primary breadwinner, died in childbirth,99 Jamaican
citizen Arthur Cecil Wilson wished to move to the United States
to care for his teenage sons Trevor and Earl after their mother,
Leony Moses, passed away. Wilson had lived with and supported
his sons until they were eleven and nine years old and moved with
Moses to New York, where the children became permanent
residents. Granted a temporary emergency visa to visit his sons,
Wilson had been denied further extensions and returned to
Jamaica where “he could work [legally] and contribute something
to the support of his children.”100 Wilson’s chances of obtaining
the required labor certification to work in the U.S. were nil, as he
described his skills and work experience as those of a
“handyman.”101 In the meantime, Trevor and Earl apparently
lived with their mother’s sister, who supported their efforts to
obtain permanent residency for Wilson. Plaintiff Serge Warner
came to the United States at the age of nine to visit his father, who
had “always supported and maintained him”; shortly thereafter,
his mother married another man and asked Cleophus, a
naturalized U.S. citizen, to “keep their son.” Cleophus and Serge
lived together in Queens thereafter; a defeat in court, they
averred, would mean that Serge would “be forced to return to a
country where there is no one to care for him.”102 Because their
children were over the age of fourteen, Wilson and Warner could
not become “parents” for the purposes of exemption from the

If Fiallo-Sone were to adopt his biological son, Rodriguez would presumably have had to
relinquish her own parental rights.
98. Amended Complaint, supra note 95, at 28. Though Fiallo-Sone successfully
obtained a stay of deportation pending the resolution of the case, he and his son departed
for the Dominican Republic before he became aware of the stay. Brief for Appellants,
supra note 97, at 11 n.11.
99. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
100. Amended Complaint, supra note 95, at 10.
101. Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
102. Amended Complaint, supra note 95, at 32.
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immigration quota system. Neither man could “cure” his son’s
illegitimacy by marrying the children’s mother.103
National origin, gender, family status, and class—in the form
of an inability to obtain labor certification for low-skilled jobs—
thus combined to prevent the Fiallo plaintiff fathers from
receiving relief from immigration restrictions that would have
enabled them to care for their children in the U.S. Relying on a
small but growing social science literature investigating paternal
involvement in children’s care and development, and highlighting
unmarried fathers’ increasing participation in their children’s
lives, the plaintiffs resisted “stereotypes which depict the father of
an illegitimate child as having little interest in and only a
superficial relationship with his child and with the child’s
mother.”104 Indeed, as their supporters emphasized, Fiallo-Sone’s,
Wilson’s, and Warner’s demonstrated devotion to their children’s
care and support throughout their lives belied such
generalizations.
In parental rights and stepfather adoption cases such as
Quilloin and Caban, fathers’ and mothers’ interests clashed; in
Fiallo, rights for nonmarital fathers aligned with those of mothers.
Indeed, Ruth Bader Ginsburg wished to file an amicus brief for
the ACLU, presumably in order to argue that discrimination
against unwed fathers devalued mothers’ citizenship rights and
reinforced sex-based stereotypes that assigned the care and
support of nonmarital children exclusively to mothers. ACLU
Legal Director Mel Wulf rejected her request, and the Legal Aid
Society’s brief only gestured to this argument in a footnote.105
Over a dissent from Justices Brennan and Marshall, who viewed
them as clearly unconstitutional sex discrimination, a majority of
the Court upheld the challenged laws as within Congress’s plenary
power to regulate immigration.106

103. In order for Cleophus Warner to legitimate Serge under the law of the French
West Indies, marriage to his mother, Elenore Carmelie Gibs, was required, and she was
married to another man. The Wilsons’ mother was deceased.
104. Amended Complaint, supra note 95, at 25.
105. See Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1329; see also Davis, supra note
10, at 99.
106. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). For more on Fiallo, see Mayeri, Marital
Supremacy, supra note 1, at 1327–31; Mayeri, Foundling Fathers, supra note 1, at 2327–30.
The Supreme Court has considered issues similar to those presented in Fiallo in several
subsequent cases. For more, see id. at 2385–88. Shortly before this essay went to press, the
Court decided Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 582 U.S. ___ (2017) (invalidating provision of
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Parham v. Hughes, decided by the Court on the same day as
Caban, also highlighted the claims of nonmarital fathers of color
who provided not merely financial support but also care and
nurture to their children. Curtis Parham sought to recover for the
wrongful death of his six-year-old son Lemuel, who perished in a
car accident alongside his mother, Cassandra Moreen. Unlike
Abdiel Caban, Parham had not lived with the mother of his child,
nor did he have legal custody of Lemuel. Like Leon Quilloin,
Parham had not formally legitimated his son (though he had
signed Lemuel’s birth certificate, acknowledging paternity), but
unlike Quilloin, Parham said that he had consistently provided
financial support, “maintained charge accounts at grocery stores
for food and other necessities,”107 visited Lemuel daily, and taken
care of him on many weekends.108 Indeed, Richmond County
Superior Court Judge Franklin H. Pierce characterized Parham as
having “in every respect treated [Lemuel] as his own.”109 And
unlike Quilloin—and Caban—Parham presented no obvious
feminist dilemma: his claim did not conflict with Lemuel’s
mother’s rights.110
Indeed, at least insofar as court records reveal, Quilloin’s and
Parham’s claims arose from caregiving arrangements that
deviated from the ideal of the marital nuclear family but reflected
the reality of many families of color: cooperation between
extended family members (the grandmothers who helped Leon
Quilloin care for Darrell in Savannah while his mother worked in
New York) and non-cohabiting parents who did not live in
marriage-like households but nevertheless participated in what
we would now call co-parenting (Parham and Moreen). In
derivative citizenship law’s differential residency requirements for U.S. citizen fathers and
mothers of nonmarital children born abroad).
107. Order, Parham v. Hughes, Findings of Fact, in Joint Appendix at 6, Parham v.
Hughes, 447 U.S. 347 (1979).
108. The lower court found that “Curtis Parham visited regularly with the deceased
child and in fact saw him virtually every day and had the child with him on many
weekends.” Order, supra note 107, at 6.
109. Pierce rejected the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that given
fathers’ primary support obligation under Georgia law, “where the father of an illegitimate
child in fact has provided some level of support for that child and has acknowledged his
paternity by execution of the birth certificate and has in every respect treated the child as
his own, the State cannot constitutionally deny that father the right to maintain an action
for the wrongful death of his child where the mother of said child is also deceased.” Order,
supra note 107, at 6.
110. His claim may have conflicted with the rights of Lemuel’s maternal grandmother,
though there is no indication in the record that this affected the Justices’ deliberations.
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contrast, Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed had lived together
with their children but had a troubled history that may have
included domestic violence (Mohammed alleged that their
relationship dissolved in part because Caban “beat her without
reason”) and Caban absconding with the children to Puerto
Rico.111
A decade before Parham reached the U.S. Supreme Court, a
different collection of Justices had ruled in Glona v. American
Guarantee and Liability Company that a Louisiana statute
denying mothers of illegitimate children the right to sue for their
wrongful death violated the federal constitution.112 Like Curtis
Parham, Minnie Brade Glona had lost her son in an automobile
accident. Like Parham, Glona did not have amici arguing on her
behalf. Unlike Parham, Glona was a mother and brought her case
in the waning days of the Warren Court, both of which likely
contributed to the more sympathetic reception her claim received.
Whereas the Court invalidated Louisiana’s exclusion of mothers
from wrongful death recovery in 1968, in 1979 a bare majority of
the Court rejected Curtis Parham’s claim.113 Justice Potter
Stewart’s plurality opinion ignored the Glona precedent,
declaring that the illegitimacy cases rested upon the premise that
penalizing children for the transgressions of their parents was
“illogical and unjust,” a rationale inapplicable to a parent’s claim.
And Stewart rejected Parham’s sex-based equal protection claim
on the ground that mothers and fathers of illegitimate children
simply were not “similarly situated.” Justice Powell, author of
Caban—handed down the same day—disagreed with the
plurality’s view that Georgia’s law did not discriminate on the
basis of sex, but found the distinction between fathers and
mothers to be substantially related to the important governmental
objective of avoiding the difficulties associated with proving
paternity.114
In the following decade, race, sex, and even class mostly
disappeared from the jurisprudence of nonmarital fatherhood. In
contrast to the 1970s plaintiffs, all of whom had been indigent, of
color, or both, the 1980s plaintiffs were white and working or
middle class. The Court avoided deciding two cases that squarely
111.
112.
113.
114.

See Joint Appendix, Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
Glona v. Am. Guar. & Cas. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
Parham v. Hughes, 447 U.S. 347 (1979).
Id. at 359–61 (Powell, J., concurring).
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raised sex discrimination claims—both involving the adoption of
newborns by strangers—and instead decided Lehr v. Robertson
(stepfather adoption) and Michael H. v. Gerald D. (marital
presumption) narrowly, on due process grounds that solidified the
legal primacy of marriage but did not consider the ramifications
of fathers’ parental rights for sex equality.115 As the intersectional
experience of nonmarital fathers of color faded into the
background, the Court continued to evaluate the constitutionality
of family status and sex discrimination using measures that had
little to do with the concerns of poverty lawyers and feminists who
weighed government intrusion into poor families and the
subordination of women heavily in the balance.116
CONCLUSION
The constitutional canon of family status largely ignores the
race, gender, and even class-based implications of privileging
marriage and marital families. This silence endured despite
constitutional arguments by plaintiffs and their advocates that
highlighted the class- and race-based disparate impact of marital
supremacy; how discrimination against illegitimate children and
their parents subordinated women by imposing economic burdens
on those responsible for nonmarital children’s care and support,
curtailing reproductive freedom, and punishing nonmarital
sexuality; and the importance of fathers’ care and nurturance as
well as financial support for children, regardless of birth status.
Indeed, litigants, scholars, and advocates advanced expansive
conceptions of sexual citizenship, feminist accounts of illegitimacy
penalties’ harm, and, to some degree, a vision of nonmarital
fatherhood that valued care and nurturance as well as the
financial support prioritized by lawmakers and judges.
In theory, a constitutional regime protective of nonnormative family status and reflective of these more expansive
visions of individual freedom and family pluralism would not
necessarily incorporate racial, economic, or even gender equality
rationales. It is possible to imagine a constitutional jurisprudence
that is universalist in scope and uses the experiences of
115. For much more on Lehr and Michael H., see Mayeri, Foundling Fathers, supra
note 1, at 2362–73. On the cases the Court avoided and decided during this period, see id.
at 2354–63 (discussing Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene and McNamara v.
Department of Social Services).
116. For more, see Mayeri, Foundling Fathers, supra note 1, at 2373–82.
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marginalized communities as the starting point for thinking about
which negative rights should be protected from government
intrusion, and which positive rights should be promoted by
constitutional law and public policy. Such a jurisprudence might
consider family pluralism a positive value, and adaptive,
nonmarital, and extended family structures a normative ideal
rather than a deviation from the nuclear family norm. It is also
possible to imagine a gender-neutral vision of individual
autonomy and of parenting that values sexual freedom and
valorizes and rewards caregiving regardless of who performs it,
and in which the state takes an active role in supporting sole
parenting, co-parenting, and extended family care irrespective of
family structure or marital status.
Conversely, the recognition that illegitimacy penalties have a
race- and class-based disparate impact by no means guarantees a
substantively progressive jurisprudence of family status. Racebased disparate impact arguments arguably helped judges who
were sympathetic to civil rights to see injustice in the illegitimacy
cases. In the welfare rights cases such arguments were a secondbest constitutional hook—better than relying on reversible
statutory interpretation grounds but less salutary than recognizing
a constitutional right to subsistence. But race and even povertybased discrimination arguments also were perfectly compatible
with an approach that focused on the harm of penalizing
blameless children for the “sins” or “transgressions” of their
parents, and with a Moynihanian focus on ascertaining paternity
and holding fathers to account for child support. Similarly, the
unwed fathers cases, and the divorced fathers’ rights movement,
illustrate how sex discrimination arguments that focus on formal
equality may help individual men achieve positive results but do
not necessarily address, and may in some circumstances
aggravate, the subordination of women. The feminist dilemma—
how to promote paternal involvement in caregiving without
impinging on maternal prerogatives under conditions of genderbased social and economic inequality—left many feminists
ambivalent, at best, about the utility of formal sex equality in
nonmarital parenthood.
What is lost, then, in the constitutional family status cases, is
the substance of the claims plaintiffs and advocates derived from
intersectional experience: how women, especially women of color,
suffer the economic burdens of laws that deprive “illegitimate”
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children of public and private support; how laws that penalize
nonmarital sexuality violate women’s sexual autonomy and
reproductive freedom; how laws that limit fathers’ rights—
especially when there are no competing maternal rights at stake—
redound to the detriment of all parents by discouraging and
demeaning caregiving work performed by men, and by
diminishing the benefits of women’s citizenship. It is not the
disappearance of race, class, and sex discrimination theories per
se, but rather the erasure of the lived experience at the
intersection of these categories that impoverishes the
constitutional law of family status.

